There is a possibility of how the two episodes, of M/V HE and M/V HP, may be co-related by the office staff.
In HE, when the valves opened by themselves resulting in cargo shift, the office liked to view this as not by itself, but by a mistake of ship staff. Therefore, in this event , Event (1), I was to held responsible , in their views.
But towards this trouble , in their viewpoint - 'they helped' in the building of "Team Work", by asking of me to adjust-amend the mistake thus avoiding the need to formally investigate and indict me for what happened and how. This was a sort of "Team Work", as the Indians in the Industry like to call this.
Comparable with this, on HP, when the vessel was found to be not having a damage stability module in its Lodicator, the mistake in my viewpoint was of Office Staff to have not notified this to me and to the Vetting Inspectors. So, now automatically, the pressure of "Team Work" was expected from me, to have adjust-make a Damage Stability Report of the cargo loadings to convince the inspectors of the vessel being compliant in all sorts, and that the office staff have not willfully lied to them. This was Event (2).
Whereas the office was viewing it from their belief of "Team work", I was insisting on doing a righteous and fair work , because for me the key to tension-free living on ship is by being fully-compliant. In my views, should a problem happen, the problems are, in most likelihood, not a new kind of experience to the industry, and therefore a methodical route to meeting the problem must have been existent, which should be taken up. Since, in the Event (1), in my views, it was not my mistake, but a kind of "force majeure", something 'by self, and not in my control', I rather contributed to the "team work" by doing the adjust-amend the cargo, thus saving the company a considerable economic loss which likely could have happened due to cost incurred through the proper channel's intervention. In my views, I was never to be held responsible, because no formal inquiry or investigation had indicted me , and further I had helped the company in timely and quick detection of the cause, which too was never formally assigned except by my help, or "by my admission", as the office would like to see it .
The office appeared to be insisting on the view that they were always capable of detecting all or any the causes which led to this trouble , and my admission was only a barter, from their view, ''to lessen by guilt in the mistake which I had only committed''. So they were not fully buying the valve-opening theory, no matter "by my mistake", or "by itself". But their alternative theory was never presented.
Perhaps , the idea was to keep me under guilt-pressure and to extract more "team works" from me.
And obviously, the time for that "team work" had arrived during Event (2).
I ,in my viewpoint, continued to see myself as pious, honest and high-integrity man because in my beliefs, that is where the stress-free living on ship lies.
The office would obviously reject my opinion about self under accusations such as "doodh ka dhula koi nahin hota" ('nobody, nowhere ever is sin-free, innocent') , and would like to 'suspect' hold me guilty, without any alternate theory from them on how I was to be held responsible. On the other hand, I would hold the office responsible of being dirty by intention, to have acted against me on as feeble grounds as Suspicion. In my knowledge and belief, such weak and uncertain grounds are the root source of "politics" between ship staff and shore staff, 'Politcs' = an opinion divide and acts having potential of betrayals. In a future real trouble , if it happens from me, one should expect an unfriendly, non-cooperating, "team work"-defying conduct from the office. By an inductive reasoning, I would sense the problem of 'politics' in office too , intra-personnel, where the Indian "Gang" (as I like to address the Indian contingent) was not in good terms with the Italian boss.
The ship owner, in my views, would like to see a trouble-free life on their ship because that is where their real profits and business reputation lies. But the Indian gang would likely counter-view it with 'claused-agreement' that "yes, but in practice it is not possible to run ships without any mishaps". So, for them, their method is the best and only method for doing a profitable business. Indian views are of curative forms, as i like to see them, while the Italians and Europeans might rather chose to focus on preventive methods to run their ships with foreign multi-national crew who they don't know well, neither they oversee their training. To the european ship owners, there is a great business risk if the focus continues to be on curative approach more with any amount, even if minimal, of office-representation in such events. Because if the events are big to attract the attention of authorities, and the european port authorities succeed in detecting any wilful office-representation, it might amount to mean office and the company were also be a part of causes of the mishap. The ship operation , for europeans, is a small-level management task, compared with tasks such as ship purchase, chartering, cargo booking, and operation budgeting. The lower management multinational should not be given so much free hand to work their discretion in their works that it might mean a connivance of the top management if the port authorities ever set to investigate a problem. The lower-management should work justly, by the book and the rules. In their own views, the europeans are spending enough money to smoothly run a ship trouble-free and even to maintain it trouble-free. This involves a good salary payment too, to keep the crew-related troubles off their ships.
Indian "gang', habitually, likes to chip-in some narcissist 'power and authority' for themselves beginning with the suggestion that 'no ship can ever be cent percent perfect and trouble-free'. And obviously, true to their narcissist cultural habits, the cause of trouble lie in the men who man the ships where the Indian gang loves to apply ,"show", its 'power and authority' to manage the troubles, if any, which happen on board.
And sure to their claims, the Indian gang might like to give pointers to the secret adjustments by the European top-management staff as well, to establish and uphold their belief that "doodh ka dhula koi nahin hota".